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Intimate Images and Authors’ Rights: NonConsensual Disclosure and the Copyright Disconnect
Meghan Sali*

INTRODUCTION
This article responds to a brand of legal realpolitik that says using property
law to respond to the non-consensual distribution of intimate images (NCDII) is
appropriate and even necessary, because its remedial frameworks are well
developed and provide the relief that is often most sought after by targets of an
assault: the immediate removal of photos from online platforms. While some
targets are not considered the ‘‘authors’’ of their intimate images, most of the
images that are the subject of NCDII are selfies, 1 taken by the target themselves.
In these cases, that person rightfully owns the copyright in those images and
would be able to make use of that right in seeking a remedy.
Some forms of unauthorized distribution fit neatly within the copyright
framework. This is the case for intimate images and videos that are consensually
commercialized by creators who find their works being reproduced without
authorization. However, copyright remedies are a much more uneasy fit for
private sexual expression, where images are shared among intimate partners or a
small circle of trusted confidants, and are ultimately hacked and released, or
shared publicly without the consent of the author. At some level, defaulting to
copyright law is logical where it provides the remedies that prove challenging for
survivors of image-based sexual abuse to secure through other means. Some
remedies for NCDII exist under both the criminal and civil law, but none offer
the swift takedown procedures that can be found under the U.S. Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) — a powerful tool for content removal on
copyright infringement grounds. Although the DMCA is an American law,
Canadians can and do make use of this tool to have images removed from online
platforms, particularly when the sites on which the images appear are based in
the U.S. or have removal policies specifically designed to respond to DMCA
notices. While copyright may in some cases afford a practical remedy, relying on
copyright to respond to image-based sexual abuse puts victims/survivors2 in the
*
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Amanda Levendowski, “Using Copyright to Combat Revenge Porn” (2014) 3:422
NYUJ Intell Prop & Ent L 422 at 426.
I employ the term victim/survivor throughout this article to describe people who are
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position of having to argue that the real harm they have suffered is to their
intellectual property interests, and not to their dignity, privacy, physical safety,
and sexual autonomy.3 Furthermore, copyright remedies do not respond to the
broader societal harms caused by NCDII and, more specifically, to the equality
interests of women, girls, LGBTQ2s+ persons, and other historically
marginalized individuals and their participation in public life.
In this article I argue that it is incumbent on legislators to develop remedies
for NCDII that do not rely on proprietary frameworks to address the harm that
results from image-based sexual abuse. The article will proceed in three parts. In
Part 1, I will discuss the nature of NCDII and conceptualize the harm. Here I
argue that NCDII is an extreme privacy invasion and a form of gender-based
violence. I briefly address how Canadian law has failed to provide an effective
remedy for the victims/survivors of NCDII — canvassing both criminal and civil
approaches to redressing the harm. In Part 2, I examine the justifications for
intellectual property law. I argue that early privacy theorists were correct to
conceptualize privacy and property as two distinct rights with material
differences in the kinds of interests they were designed to protect. I make the
case that the modern Anglo-American approach to copyright — dominant in
Canada and the U.S. — is weighted towards economic rights and explore how
the Supreme Court of Canada’s articulation of copyright’s purpose balances
these economic rights with public interest concerns. In Part 3, I discuss how
copyright remedies fail to respond to NCDII harms, including privacy, dignity,
and equality. I acknowledge that copyright, when used as a practical tool,
provides some remedies that may otherwise prove elusive, but I also highlight the
inherent challenges faced by individuals relying on copyright law for those
remedies. I conclude with the recommendation that legislators should focus on
creating a sui generis remedial framework for NCDII that acknowledges the true
nature of the harm and provides victims/survivors with effective remedies —
including those that are so powerful and attractive within copyright law.

1. NCDII IS AN EXTREME PRIVACY VIOLATION AND A FORM OF
GENDER-BASED VIOLENCE
The use of private, sexual images and videos to perpetrate harm against the
individual(s) depicted in them is all too common. In 2012 and 2013, the deaths of
Amanda Todd and Rehteah Parsons drew national media attention after vicious
online harassment and abuse resulting from sexual images and videos made

3

negatively affected by image-based sexual abuse. The use of a hybrid term is intended to
be inclusive of individuals who identify with either or both labels and ‘‘references the
potential for positive affirmations of agency and empowerment in the face of violence.”
See Christopher Parsons et al, The Predator in Your Pocket: A Multidisciplinary
Assessment of the Stalkerware Application Industry (Citizen Lab, 2019) at 11.
Danielle Citron, ‘‘Sexual Privacy” (2019) 128:7 Yale LJ 1870 at 1882 (describing how
sexual privacy is foundational to the exercise of human agency and sexual autonomy).
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public by their abusers contributed to their deaths by suicide.4 Following these
high profile tragedies, in 2015 the government criminalized NCDII. 5 According
to Statistics Canada data, reported incidents of NCDII are on the rise — between
2015 and 2020, individual complaints reported to the police surpassed 8,000, with
over 2,200 incidents reported in 2020 alone.6 It is reasonable to assume that these
numbers capture only a fraction of the abusive activity, as study after study
shows that incidents of sexual violence are persistently underreported.7
Although NCDII often does not involve physical contact, it should be
understood as an extreme privacy violation and a form of gender-based violence
(GBV). The Government of Canada describes GBV as violence targeted at
individuals because of their gender, gender expression, gender identity, or
perceived gender.8 Women and girls are not the only targets of GBV —
individuals whose gender identity and expression challenges patriarchal norms,
including transgender, non-binary, and gender non-conforming people are also
frequently the targets of abuse and harassment because of discriminatory gender
norms.9 Critically, GBV is not limited to physical acts, but ‘‘can include any
word, action, or attempt to degrade, control, humiliate, intimidate, coerce,
deprive, threaten, or harm another person”.10 GBV operates to ‘‘seriously
[inhibit] women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality with
men.”11 Situating NCDII within a broad definition of violence that also
encompasses non-physical acts provides necessary context, plotting NCDII as
4
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Angela Mulholland, “Amanda Todd’s mother saddened by Rehtaeh Parsons suicide”,
CTV News (11 April 2013), online: <www.ctvnews.ca/canada/amanda-todd-s-mothersaddened-by-rehtaeh-parsons-suicide-1.1233416>.
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 621.1(1).
Statistics Canada, ‘‘Incident-Based Crime Statistics, Annual”, Table: 35-10-0177-01 (27
July 2021), online: <https://www150.statcan.gc.ca/t1/tbl1/en/tv.action?pid=3510017701&pickMembers%5B0%5D=1.1&pickMembers%5B1%5D=2.257&cubeTimeFrame.startYear=2014&cubeTimeFrame.endYear=2020&referencePeriods=20140101%2C20200101>.
See Cecilia Benoit et al, Issue Brief: Sexual Violence Against Women in Canada,
commissioned by the Federal-Provincial-Territorial Senior Officials for the Status of
Women (2015) at 5, online: <cfc-swc.gc.ca/svawc-vcsfc/issue-brief-en.pdf>; Alana
Prochuk, Women’s Experiences of the Barriers to Reporting Sexual Assault (Vancouver:
West Coast LEAF, 2018) at 12-13, online: <www.westcoastleaf.org/wp-content/
uploads/2018/10/West-Coast-Leaf-dismantling-web-final.pdf>.
Government of Canada, “About Gender-Based Violence” (28 October 2020), online:
Status of Women in Canada <cfc-swc.gc.ca/violence/knowledge-connaissance/aboutapropos-en.html#what> [About GBV].
Suzie Dunn, Technology-Facilitated Gender-Based Violence: An Overview (Ottawa:
Centre for International Governance Innovation, 2020) at 3, online: <www.cigionline.org/publications/technology-facilitated-gender-based-violence-overview>.
About GBV, supra note 8.
UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
CEDAW General Recommendation No. 19: Violence against women (1992), online:
<www.refworld.org/docid/52d920c54.html> [accessed 27 December 2020].
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one point on a continuum of violent behaviour, which abusers routinely target at
women and girls.12
Offline, women and girls are frequently the subjects of sexual violence by
their intimate partners.13 With the rise of digital technology, this form of abuse
has migrated online, where perpetrators make use of technology that can
broaden the impact of their abusive behaviour. Some of the earliest demographic
data on NCDII comes from an oft-cited 2013 self-report study by the Cyber Civil
Rights Initiative (CCRI) showing 90 percent of NCDII victims are women. 14
More recent research from Australia suggests that, while gender is one factor
influencing who is affected by NCDII, there is an even higher rate of
victimization among members of marginalized groups. 15 With this said,
women and girls who have their images non-consensually shared online are
likely to face harsher societal consequences than men.16 Even where intimate
images are not ultimately distributed, threats to do so lead some individuals to
remain in sexual relationships against their wishes, where they may experience
other forms of abuse. NCDII is often perpetrated alongside other well-known
forms of intimate partner violence, including physical and sexual assault. 17
Clarity around terminology will help to properly situate the harm. In the
context of NCDII, abusers often publicize intimate photos or videos that were
exchanged during an intimate relationship after the relationship has ended, as
retribution for some perceived offence — leading to the genesis of the term
‘‘revenge porn.”18 In recent years, the term has been popularized in public
12
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A definition of violence that encompasses non-physical acts is not without controversy.
Too broad a definition is thought by some to undermine the significance and impact of
physical violence. See Oren Nimni, ‘‘Defining Violence”, Current Affairs (17 September
2017), online: <https://www.currentaffairs.org/2017/09/defining-violence>.
World Health Organization, Global and regional estimates of violence against women:
Prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence and non-partner sexual violence
(Geneva: WHO, 2013).
Jessica Roy, “California’s New Anti-Revenge Porn Bill Won’t Protect Most Victims”,
Time (3 October 2013), online: <nation.time.com/2013/10/03/californias-new-antirevenge-porn-bill-wont-protect-most-victims/#:~:text=A%20survey%20conducted%20by%20the,protect%20a%20minority%20of%20victims>.
Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Institute of Criminology, Image-based sexual abuse:
victims and perpetrators by Nicola Henry, Asher Flynn & Anastasia Powell, Trends and
Issues in Crime & Criminal Justice (2019) at 5.
Alexadra Dodge, Punishing ‘Revenge Porn’: Legal Interpretations of and Responses to
Non-Consensual Intimate Image Distribution in Canada (PhD Dissertation, Carleton
University, 2019) [unpublished] at 135-37 [Dodge, ‘‘Punishing ‘Revenge Porn’”].
Dunn, supra note 9 at 3-4.
Despite the popularity of this term and the considerable proportion of NCDII that stems
from the misuse of intimate images shared within relationships, a significant portion of
NCDII does not take place within or following an intimate relationship. Consider, for
example, the numerous instances in which devices were hacked and images stolen for
release. See e.g. Suzie Dunn & Alessia Petricone-Westwood, “More than ‘Revenge
Porn’: Civil Remedies for the Nonconsensual Distribution of Intimate Images” (Paper
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discourse and is often used as a catch-all for different kinds of harms perpetrated
using intimate images and videos. However, scholars in the field have criticized
the term, both for failing to accurately describe the breadth of activity related to
private, sexual images and for obscuring the motives behind the
misappropriation of such images. Clare McGlynn and Erika Rackley prefer
the broad descriptor ‘‘image-based sexual abuse,” of which NCDII is one
subset.19 Other examples of image-based sexual abuse include voyeurism and
‘‘upskirting,” where images of a sexual nature are surreptitiously recorded, and
often distributed, without consent; recording sexual assaults; ‘‘sextortion,” where
individuals are coerced into creating images or engaging in sexual acts under
threat of exposure; and altering photos so that they appear to be sexual in
nature.20
Further, scholars have criticized the use of the term ‘‘cyberbullying” to
describe image-based sexual abuse. In a submission to the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women, Valerie Steeves, Jane Bailey and Suzie Dunn argued
that the term ‘‘technology-facilitated violence against women and girls”
(TFVAWG) best conceptualizes the kinds of gendered harms perpetrated using
digital technologies. They push back on the use of the word ‘‘cyberbullying” to
characterize the type of abuse suffered by victims like Reteah Parsons and
Amanda Todd, arguing that it tends to trivialize the harm and can open the door
to paternalistic advice and victim blaming.21 It is important to bear these
critiques in mind as much of the recent scholarship on this issue uses one or both
of the terms ‘‘cyberbullying” and ‘‘revenge porn.”
In this paper, I focus on one category of image-based sexual abuse: NCDII.
Narrowing further within the category, I have chosen to examine the legal
remedies available in cases where victims are the authors of their images for the
purposes of copyright law.22 Research suggests that the vast majority of images
that are the subject of NCDII are selfies — taken by the individual depicted in
the photo or video.23 I focus on these cases in part because they make up the
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22

delivered at the 38th Annual Civil Litigation Conference, Mont-Tremblant, November
2018).
Clare McGlynn & Erika Rackley, “Image-Based Sexual Abuse” (2017) 37:3 Oxford J
Leg Stud 534 at 538.
Ibid.
Jane Bailey, Valerie Steeves & Suzanne Dunn, “Submission to The Special Rapporteur
on Violence Against Women Re: Regulating Online Violence and Harassment Against
Women” (2017) at 3, online (pdf): Equality Project <www.equalityproject.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2017/12/Bailey-Steeves-Dunn-Submission-27-Sep-2017.pdf>.
The definition of authorship for the purposes of copyright protection has undergone
significant change in the past decade. Prior to the 2012 Copyright Modernization Act, s
10(2) of Canada’s Copyright Act deemed the author of an image to be the owner of the
initial negative or photograph. Before this section of the Copyright Act was amended, an
individual who created an image of themselves on a device belonging to someone else
would not have been the author of the image for the purpose of pursuing copyright
remedies. See Copyright Act, RSC 1985, c C-42 as it appeared on December 2005.
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majority of the reported examples, but also because these are the only instances
in which copyright law provides some of the remedies sought by victims/
survivors. As such, it is not within the scope of this paper to address what is
sometimes called non-consensual pornography, in which the individuals were not
the authors of the intimate images shared without their consent. In these
circumstances, copyright can provide no remedy. In fact, in cases where the
subject of the photo is not its author, copyright law may serve as an impediment
to having such images removed from online platforms, leaving a criminal
complaint or other civil law remedy as the only avenues open to the person
targeted to redress NDCII injury.

(a) A True Accounting of the Harms
In order for the law to respond appropriately to the harm caused by NCDII,
lawmakers must understand and properly conceptualize the nature of the harm,
beginning with the injuries inflicted on the individual victim/survivor. Much of
the collected data and research into the nature and the extent of NCDII harms
comes from the U.S. and other higher income countries. 24 Noting this, I have
used Canadian sources and data where possible.
According to the CCRI self-report survey, targets of ‘‘revenge porn”
reported that their personal identifying information was often posted alongside
their nude photos or videos.25 Among other items, the information commonly
included one or more of the following: their full name (85%), email address
(26%), social media profile information (49%), home address (16%), and phone
number (20%).26 The inclusion of personal identifying information means that
individuals who are targeted by image-based sexual abuse also face threats to
their physical safety and are increasingly likely to be stalked and assaulted
offline.27 Some targets have reported receiving death and rape threats as a result
of their images being shared.28 Even where the abuse does not extend to offline
actions, the psychological impacts are serious and prolonged. Victims/survivors
reported experiencing severe fear and anxiety that their photos would be found
by friends, family, and employers,29 often resulting in depression, panic attacks,
and extreme emotional distress.30 Critically, financial loss to the value of
23
24
25

26
27

28
29
30

Levendowski, supra note 1 at 426.
Dunn, supra note 9 at 1-2.
Cyber Civil Rights Initiative, “End Revenge Porn: A Campaign of the Cyber Civil Rights
Initiative” (2013), online (pdf): <www.endrevengeporn.org/main_2013/wp-content/
uploads/2014/12/RPStatistics.pdf>.
Ibid.
Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, “Criminalizing Revenge Porn” (2014) 49
Wake Forest L Rev 345 at 350.
Ibid. at 353.
Levendowski, supra note 1 at 424.
Citron & Franks, supra note 27 at 351.
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(intellectual) property is rarely, if ever, cited as a harm experienced by individual
victims/survivors of NCDII. Scholars and researchers in this area have
underscored the amplification effect that the internet has on these harms 31 —
exponentially expanding the reach of content and resulting in an unrelenting
cycle of victimization and fear that photos and videos are never truly gone, even
if the individuals depicted have managed to overcome the legal and practical
hurdles to having them removed from certain platforms.32
Individuals whose private, sexual images are shared without their consent
suffer significant reputational harms. In a series of qualitative interviews with
researcher Samantha Bates, NCDII victims/survivors discussed the impact that
abusers publicizing their images had on their relationships. While some reported
that their families were supportive and a source of strength and healing, others
experienced extreme discord in their family lives because of their intimate images
being made public.33 Respondents reported feeling judged and blamed by their
families, moving out of their homes, and becoming estranged and withdrawn due
to internalized shame.34 Multiple participants reported concern that their photos
would be used against them in ongoing custody disputes.35 Women who were
targets of NCDII within an intimate relationship described feeling less trusting in
subsequent relationships, with some saying that it led them to avoiding intimate
relationships altogether.36 Those targeted by NCDII also reported lasting
impacts to their friendships. Again, some individuals described forming deeper
bonds with friends who supported them, but others explained how they shared
social circles with their abusers and how having mutual friends that remained
connected to both them and their abuser made social interactions ‘‘very tense.” 37
Finally, nearly all the participants described impacts on their professional lives. 38
As employers increasingly turn to online searches to evaluate applicants, search
results that prominently feature sexualized images are no doubt harmful to the
careers and employment prospects of victims/survivors.39
31
32

33

34

35
36
37
38
39

Dunn, supra note 9 at 3.
Jessica M Goldstein, “‘Revenge porn’ was already commonplace. The pandemic has
made things even worse.” The Washington Post (29 October 2020), online: <www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/revenge-porn-nonconsensual-porn/2020/10/28/
603b88f4-dbf1-11ea-b205-ff838e15a9a6_story.html>.
But see Alexa Dodge, ‘‘‘Try Not to be Embarrassed’: A Sex Positive Analysis of
Nonconsensual Pornography Case Law” (2021) 29 Fem Leg Stud 23 [Dodge, ‘‘Try Not
to be Embarrassed”] (examining how sex-negativity is embedded into police and legal
responses to NCDII, reinforcing feelings of shame and blame in victims/survivors).
Samantha Lynn Bates, ‘‘Stripped”: an analysis of revenge porn victims’ lives after
victimization (MA Thesis, Simon Fraser University, 2015) at 79-82 [unpublished].
Ibid. at 84.
Ibid. at 87.
Ibid. at 92.
Ibid. at 112.
Citron & Franks, supra note 27 at 352.
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Targets of abuse often face additional harm when they choose to speak out
or report their abuse to authorities, likely contributing to the underreported
nature of NCDII. Some have observed anecdotally that police and prosecutors
are hesitant to take reports of NCDII seriously.40 Police responses have been
reported to include dismissive remarks that veer into victim blaming, 41 made
increasingly likely in the instances that are the focus of this analysis, where the
individuals whose intimate photos are publicized created the images themselves.
In addition to potential re-victimization by authorities, people who report their
abusers or go to the police can be targets of further harassment, both online and
offline.42 When complainants pursue their claims in court, having their names
associated with the action can bring more unwanted publicity and is a significant
deterrent for victims/survivors. 43 Although some suits can be pursued
pseudonymously, courts can be reluctant to allow anonymity for claimants
where they feel it will interfere with the open court principle. 44
Like other kinds of gender-based violence, NCDII is a form of
discrimination that scholars argue must be recognized as a threat to the
human rights of women and girls.45 In her 2018 report, UN Special Rapporteur
on violence against women, Dubravka Šimonović, addressed the rising trend of
online violence against women, noting how ‘‘patriarchal patterns that result in
gender-based violence offline are reproduced, and sometimes amplified and
redefined in [information communications technology], while new forms of
violence emerge.”46 Knowing they are more likely to be targeted by gendered
violence drives some women to retreat from the internet and reduce their online
interactions, limiting the participation of women and girls in society and public
discourse.47 This threat is pronounced for women in leadership roles, including
human rights defenders, politicians, parliamentarians and journalists, who are
more likely to become targets of hate and harassment online.48 Online comments
in response to non-consensually distributed images reveal that this kind of abuse
propagates false narratives about women’s sexual availability to men, and
reinforces the idea that women’s bodies are merely tools for male sexual
40
41

42
43
44

45
46

47
48

Ibid. at pp 366-67; Levendowski, supra note 1 at 437; Bates, supra note 34 at 94 et seq.
A Moira Aikenhead, “Non-Consensual Disclosure of Intimate Images as a Crime of
Gender-Based Violence” (2018) 30 CJWL 117 at 127; Citron & Franks, supra note 27 at
367.
Goldstein, supra note 32.
Citron & Franks, supra note 27 at 352.
A.B. (Litigation Guardian of) v. Bragg Communications Inc., 2012 SCC 46, 2012
CarswellNS 675, 2012 CarswellNS 676 (S.C.C.).
Bailey, Steeves & Dunn, supra note 21 at 2.
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on violence against women, its
causes and consequences on online violence against women and girls from a human rights
perspective, UNGAOR, 38th Sess, UN Doc A/HRC/38/47 (16 June 2018) at 20.
Ibid.
Ibid. at 28.

INTIMATE IMAGES AND AUTHORS’ RIGHTS

341

gratification.49 NCDII is among the new forms of patriarchal control referred to
by Šimonović and contributes to extending the threat of violence under which
many women already live, further undermining gender equality.50
While women and girls are frequently targeted by this kind of abusive
behaviour, it is important to note that individuals from other historically
marginalized groups are also common targets. For example, a recent study on
the victims and perpetrators of image-based sexual abuse conducted by Nicole
Henry, Asher Flynn and Anastasia Powell shows that victimization is higher
among LGBTQ2s+ and Indigenous populations.51 The intersection between
overlapping sites of oppression52 is visible in the data, revealing that this kind of
abusive behaviour is rooted not only in misogyny and patriarchy, but also in
colonialism, racism, transphobia, and homophobia.

(b) Privacy Interests are Only One Source of NCDII Harms
Generally, when legal scholars have addressed NCDII, they have found that
the basis for the harm is rooted in a violation of the targeted individual’s privacy
interests — and legislative responses have reinforced this conceptualization. 53
For example, making out the criminal offence of NCDII is predicated on finding
that the individual targeted by the non-consensual disclosure had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the image(s).54 Similarly, some of the civil law
frameworks that have been invoked to respond to NCDII also focus on the
privacy violation, including public disclosure of private facts and breach of
confidence.55
Although difficult to succinctly describe due to the abundance of different
conceptualizations offered by various scholars,56 privacy is recognized as a
49
50
51
52

53
54
55
56

Dunn, supra note 9 at 10.
Aikenhead, supra note 41 at 124.
Henry, Flynn & Powell, supra note 15 at 9.
See Kimberlé Crenshaw, ‘‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist
Politics” (1989) U Chicago Legal F 139 (describing how the dominant framework for
understanding discrimination sees subordination along a single categorical axis, whereas
in reality this approach erases the experience of those who occupy multiple marginalized
identities).
Aikenhead, supra note 41 at 128.
Ibid.
Bailey, Steeves & Dunn, supra note 21 at 10.
Daniel Solove’s formative article ‘‘Conceptualizing Privacy” canvases a number of
different theories of privacy. Among them are: the right to be let alone, which protects a
sphere of inviolate personality and allows individuals to preserve peace of mind; limited
access to the self, which bears some similarities to the right to be let alone, encompassing
the right to maintain one’s own affairs without observation by other individuals or
government actors; secrecy, which Solove associates with keeping personal facts about
oneself concealed; control over personal information, which involves individuals
maintaining control over the manner of (non)disclosure of information about
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fundamental human right.57 While some theorists describe the right to control
information and to be left alone as a kind of property interest,58 in their seminal
1980 article, ‘‘The Right to Privacy,” Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis
advanced the argument that privacy is a cognizable legal interest of its own.
Warren and Brandeis draw a distinction between privacy, which they say
protects one’s thoughts, sentiments, and emotions, and property, which protects
against injuries that ‘‘are in their nature material rather than spiritual.” 59
Tellingly, the genesis of the article, which has since been hailed as the
‘‘foundation of privacy law in the United States,”60 was the (mis)use of a
woman’s image. On the occasion of his daughter’s wedding, Warren is said to
have been outraged at the way journalists were dogged in their attempts to obtain
images of the event to publish in the gossip columns.61
Ample writing on privacy theory has articulated several intersecting interests
sheltered under the broad umbrella of privacy, many of which are directly
implicated in the context of NCDII. First, privacy affords individuals control
over personal information about themselves.62 The Supreme Court of Canada
has acknowledged this as a key element of privacy, specifically in the context of
images, describing control over visual information as ‘‘a facet of privacy linked
to personal autonomy.”63 Consent is the reverse side of the control coin, and
many legislative interventions designed to protect privacy seek to give individuals
control through requiring consent for the collection, use, and disclosure of
information.64 Abusers who use sexual images of women to harm them do so in
the absence of consent (regardless of whether the image was first consensually
shared with them) and the non-consensual nature of the action is what forms the
basis of the abuse. Within the framework of personhood, privacy is also closely
linked to human dignity. Stanley Benn writes about the coercive power of
surveillance, arguing that privacy creates a space for self-creation and

57

58

59
60
61

62
63

64

themselves; personhood, in which privacy serves the end of protecting the personality
and dignity of individuals; and intimacy, a theory which recognizes privacy as essential to
the formation of relationships. See Daniel Solove, “Conceptualizing Privacy” (2005) 90
California L Rev 1087.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217A (III), UNGAOR, 3rd Sess, Supp
No 13, UN Doc A/810 (1948) 71.
Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Privacy Property, revised ed (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1991) at 296.
Louis D Brandeis & Samuel Warren, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 Harvard L Rev.
Solove, supra note 56 at 1100.
Irwin R Kramer, “The The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis”
(1990) Catholic University L Rev 39:3 at 709.
Solove, supra note 56 at 1109.
R. v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10, 2019 CarswellOnt 1921, 2019 CarswellOnt 1922 (S.C.C.), per
Rowe J., concurring at para. 135 [Jarvis].
See e.g. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5, s
4.2. [PIPEDA]; Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21, ss 7-8.
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exploration ‘‘which could be disrupted, distorted, or frustrated even by so limited
an intrusion as watching.”65 Here, observation by the public disrupts women’s
private sexual expression, and women who fear that their sexual expression is
likely to be weaponized against them are therefore less likely to engage in this
kind of expression, narrowing the space for self-creation and exploration.
Another highly relevant consideration in the context of NCDII is the
interrelation between privacy and intimacy. Many scholars have argued that
privacy is a precondition to forming intimate relationships of love, friendship,
and trust66 — and that the ability to control information about oneself, and to
selectively share information within the context of an intimate relationship, is a
core principle that privacy should protect.67 Images that are used to abuse are
often created in the context of intimate relationships, where they were perhaps
shared as an act of intimacy building, before being turned against the women
who created them. These three values — control, dignity, and intimacy — are
essential to understanding why the act of sharing private, sexual images without
consent is theoretically rooted in privacy violation. Danielle Citron writes
compellingly about the unique nature of sexual privacy, which she situates at the
‘‘apex of privacy values,” arguing that ‘‘we are free only insofar as we can
manage the boundaries of our bodies and intimate activities.”68
Privacy’s contextual nature is also highly relevant when considering NCDII.
We know that a large majority of the intimate images and videos that are the
subject of NCDII were originally authored by the individuals depicted in them,
and in many cases these photos were shared consensually with another person in
the context of an intimate relationship. Helen Nissenbaum advances a theory of
contextual integrity, arguing that that how information is shared — including the
nature of the relationship in which it is shared — is critical to understanding
whether a privacy violation has occurred.69 Although the photographer/subject
may have consented to sharing these images with an intimate partner, the
subsequent non-consensual sharing outside of that relationship forms the basis
for the harm.
Contextual integrity is recognized in Canadian law, where consent given in
one context and for one purpose cannot be assumed to extend to other contexts
and purposes. Accordingly, public and private sector privacy legislation has long
rejected a binary notion of privacy that says information is either public or
65
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private, recognizing that contextual circumstances are critical to understanding
whether a person has given meaningful consent for the information to be
collected, used, and disclosed. For example, Principle 3 of the Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) emphasizes
the contextual nature of consent, directing entities collecting and disclosing
information to take into account the reasonable expectations of the individual
subject in determining whether consent has been obtained.70 Once given, consent
is not a blank cheque. Instead, it must be obtained for a specific purpose, and
that purpose needs to be clearly communicated to the data subject. 71 Similarly,
the Privacy Act, which governs information held by public entities, specifies that
information may only be used ‘‘for the purpose for which the information was
obtained.”72
The Supreme Court of Canada has further affirmed that an individual’s
reasonable expectation of privacy is contextual. In the 2019 R. v. Jarvis decision,
the court found that in order to determine whether an individual had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in a surreptitiously recorded video, ‘‘a court
must consider the entire context in which the observation or recording took
place”.73 In this case, a teacher at a high school had secretly recorded his female
students with a pen camera and was charged with voyeurism. The court found
that the location of the recording — in a high school, which the Court classified
as a semi-public setting — was not the only or even the most important factor to
consider in determining that the girls had a reasonable expectation of privacy. 74
Looking at other contextual factors, including the subject matter of the recording
and the relationship between the person observed and the person recording,75 the
Court found it was reasonable for teenage students to have an expectation of
privacy in a school setting.76 Experts in the field have noted that the criminal
offence of voyeurism shares similar features to the prohibition on NCDII,
including the necessary finding that the targeted individual had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the images.77
Although it is undisputed that privacy is among the core interests at stake
when considering the non-consensual sharing of private, sexual images, a
privacy-reductionist theory of NCDII harms fails to capture the full extent of the
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injury. Moira Aikenhead argues that, in addition to privacy violations, the
myriad other harms suffered by survivors of this kind of image-based sexual
abuse — including sexual violation, threats to physical safety, and to mental
wellbeing — strain against the doctrinal limits of privacy law.78 She also warns
that the criminal law response, which relies heavily on the reasonable expectation
of privacy concept, fails to account for how women experience privacy differently
than men.79 Kristen Thomasen and Suzie Dunn further expand on this
argument, suggesting that ‘‘our normative and legal concepts of privacy must
evolve to counter the gender-based harms arising from [the] misuse of new
technology,” particularly in the context of sexualized images of women. 80 The
harms of NCDII go beyond violating the privacy of the individual; they also
negatively impact an individual’s safety and sexual autonomy and inflict broader
injury to the equality interests of women and girls.

(c) Existing Remedies Often Fail to Provide Victims with the Relief Sought
Several legal responses have been advanced to combat NCDII. Calls for an
effective criminal law response have been increasing in both the U.S. and Canada
in recent years,81 culminating in the Criminal Code provisions enacted by the
federal government in 2015. Some scholars have argued that the criminal law
succeeds in addressing elements of the wrong for which the civil responses seem
inadequate, including addressing the moral blameworthiness and seriousness of
the act, and providing an avenue for public denunciation and recognition of the
harm to society in addition to the harm to the individual. 82 Proponents of a
criminal law response have also highlighted how the permanency of a criminal
record serves as a more effective deterrent.83
Acknowledging the seriousness of sexual violence and the need for societal
condemnation of these acts, feminist scholars have questioned the utility of the
criminal law as a response. Constance Backhouse, in an article on feminist
remedies for sexual assault, poses the prescient question of whether prisons
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‘‘steeped in cultures of masculinist excess” present any real means of achieving
the long-term ends of reducing sexual violence.84 Elizabeth Burnstein coined the
term ‘‘carceral feminism” to describe the tendency of some feminists to rely on
policing and imprisonment to respond to sexual violence.85 This phenomenon
was described by Aya Gruber as an outgrowth of the domestic violence and rape
reform movements of 1960s and 1970s.86 Focusing on the alliance between antitrafficking advocates and the carceral state, Burnstein underscores how relying
on incarceration as a response to sexual abuse and exploitation misses the
systemic nature of the problem, ‘‘effectively [locating] all social harm outside of
the institutions of corporate capitalism and the state apparatus.” 87 The carceral
feminist movement has earned condemnation from other spheres of critical
feminist thought, with scholars like Mimi Kim arguing that, not only does the
criminal justice system perpetrate the violent oppression of marginalized
communities, but it also fails to respond to the needs and concerns of those
most affected by gendered violence.88 Critical feminists warn that we must be
wary of the ways that victimization of women and children can be weaponized to
the ends of imposing harsher criminal sanctions that fall disproportionately on
those groups and individuals who are already over-incarcerated and whose
social, sexual, and racial identities place them at greater risk.89
In the context of NCDII, the criminal law’s significant shortcomings are
evident. Alexa Dodge points out a number of ways in which the adversarial
criminal systems fails to secure the results sought by those who are the targets of
NCDII.90 First, the criminal response to NCDII rarely addresses the continued
circulation of images shared without consent.91 Second, marginalized victims/
survivors may be additionally hesitant about turning to the criminal justice
system for remedy, given the mistrust of police and of the carceral systems that
subject racialized and other historically marginalized individuals and
communities to trauma and cruelty.92 Among youth, where it is generally
reported that sharing of intimate images, both consensually and nonconsensually, happens at higher rates than among adult populations, 93
84

85

86
87
88

89
90
91
92

Constance Backhouse, “A Feminist Remedy for Sexual Assault: A Quest for Answers”
in Elizabeth Sheehy, ed, Sexual Assault in Canada (Ottawa: OpenEdition Books, 2017) at
17.
Elizabeth Bernstein, ‘‘The Sexual Politics of the ‘New Abolitionism’” (2007) 18:3
Differences 128.
Aya Gruber, ‘‘The Feminist War on Crime” (2007) 92 Iowa L Rev 741 at 748.
Bernstein, supra note 85 at 144.
Mimi E Kim, ‘‘From carceral feminism to transformative justice: women-of-colour
feminism and alternatives to incarceration” (2018) 27:3 J Ethnic Cultural Diversity Soc
Work 219 at 226.
Burnstein, supra note 85 at 133.
Dodge,‘‘Punishing ‘Revenge Porn’”, supra note 16 at 204.
Ibid. at 203.
Ibid. at 207.

INTIMATE IMAGES AND AUTHORS’ RIGHTS

347

engaging in criminal justice processes to remedy NCDII is undesirable to those
targeted, and fear of criminalizing their peers may prevent young people from
reporting abuse when it happens. 94
There is, however, no consensus among feminist scholars as to how to
appropriately reshape the legal response to sexual offences. In their article
‘‘Criminalizing Revenge Porn”, Citron and Franks acknowledge serious
concerns with the criminal law, including overcriminalization and
overincarceration, but counter that choosing the appropriate legal framework
requires consideration of:
the seriousness of the harm caused and whether such harm is
adequately conceptualized as a harm only to individuals, for which
tort remedies are sufficient, or should be conceptualized as a harm to
both individuals and society as a whole for which civil penalties are not
adequate, thus warranting criminal penalties.95

Despite the continued debate about the appropriate role for the criminal law
in responding to sexual violence in general and NCDII specifically, among some
groups of legal feminists there is commitment to the notion that the criminal law
has some role to play.96
Various private law approaches are also potentially applicable to NCDII,
including the torts of harassment, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
breach of confidence, and intrusion upon seclusion.97 Despite the various
potential avenues of legal action for survivors of NCDII, critics have identified a
number of challenges with bringing a claim under these causes of action. Citron
and Franks outline the trilogy of obstacles facing survivors who turn to the civil
law for recourse.98 First, the law often fails to provide the remedy most sought
after by survivors: the expeditious removal of photos and images from the
internet. Second, few survivors have the resources to bring a claim against their
abuser. Third, in the circumstances where a survivor does have the resources to
bring a claim and is ultimately successful, many defendants do not have the
resources to pay the damages that are likely to be awarded.
In view of these challenges, a recent article by Canadian legal scholars Emily
Laidlaw and Hilary Young proposes the development of a ‘‘revenge porn tort”
tailored to respond to the unique context and specific remedies sought by
survivors.99 Their proposed remedial framework is simple: in order to seek
declaratory relief, the only elements that the plaintiff would have to prove is that
93
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the defendant distributed an intimate image in which they are featured. 100 Under
this ‘‘fast-track tort,” once a declaration is obtained, the plaintiff would have
access to removal from online platforms and injunction against the
defendant(s).101 This new cause of action is designed to decrease the time and
cost associated with a tort-based approach to NCDII.
In the absence of such a response, advocates often recommend using
copyright law to address the proliferation of NCDII online. American
intellectual property scholar Amanda Levendowski makes a compelling
argument that copyright law is a practical remedy that can be used by victims/
survivors seeking the removal of their intimate images from websites and online
platforms that have reproduced them without authorization.102 Because NCDII
so often involves selfies — where the subject of the video or image is also its
author — copyright allows them to assert an intellectual property right over the
image and to seek the corresponding remedies, including injunctions and
damages. While damages are an extraordinary remedy, and may be challenging
to collect for the reasons outlined above, injunctions and takedown orders are
relatively easy to secure, and they achieve the end goals of the individuals seeking
redress: the removal of the photos and images from where they are hosted online.
In light of the serious injury that results from NCDII, we must ask whether it is
fair to victims of NCDII to push them towards intellectual property remedies.
Put simply, can a proprietary framework properly account for the interests and
values at stake?

2. THE INTERESTS AND INCENTIVES THAT UNDERLIE THE
GRANTING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
In the context of a discussion about instrumentalizing copyright remedies to
respond to NCDII, the interests and incentives underlying copyright and
intellectual property rights more generally are significant and worthy of
exploration. Some may reasonably question whether the policy objectives and
animating purpose of copyright law are relevant if copyright can be marshalled
to achieve the desired result. The response to ‘‘why does it matter if it works?” is
that it does not work, or at least that copyright law does not do the work that
needs to be done in the context of NCDII. First, although the remedies may be
appealing, leaving NCDII victims/survivors with copyright law as the most
practical remedy inflicts a psychic injury, suggesting that the law sees intellectual
property rights as more significant than dignity, safety, and sexual privacy. In
addition to the consequential effects of legislation, what and how we legislate
performs a social signalling function, demonstrating what we value and sanction
as a society. Second, because copyright law is a primarily economic tool,
repurposing it to address image-based sexual abuse has the distasteful side effect
100
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of ‘‘commercializing” images that were originally created in the context of
intimacy building and self-exploration.103 We should resist the march of market
logic into intimate spaces where we create and experiment with the boundaries of
our bodies and our sexuality. Third, it is uncontroversial to say that a law’s
purpose informs its application, and that, correspondingly, its purpose is
informed by the values it attempts to safeguard or the harms it exists to prevent.
As I will discuss in this section, the values and interests at the core of copyright
law are not aligned with the privacy, sexual autonomy, and equality issues
central to NCDII.
Property law theories are often used to justify the granting of intellectual
property rights, and those theories in turn shape the contours of legal protections
and play an important role in lawmaking and judicial interpretation. In his
famous 1987 book chapter, Theories of Intellectual Property Law, William Fisher
identifies four main theoretical justifications for the granting of intellectual
property rights: utilitarianism, labour theory, personality theory, and social
planning theory.104 Of those theories, Fisher argues that utilitarianism and
labour theory have been the most prominent and influential — an argument that
is borne out in copyright case law, as examined later in this section. 105 Before
diving into how these theoretical justifications have been put to use by lawyers
and judges, a brief — and necessarily simplified — explanation of their contents
is warranted.
Utilitarianism, as applied to intellectual property, seeks to maximize social
welfare through the granting of rights in relation to one’s creative, original
intellectual creation. Utilitarianism, as envisioned by Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill, aimed to bring about ‘‘the greatest amount of good for the greatest
number [of people].”106 Fisher argues that, in the copyright context, the drive to
translate the ‘‘greatest good” into an objectively verifiable standard generally
leads to the adoption of an economic benchmark by which the greatest good can
be assessed.107 Critics decry this approach as reducing social welfare to a crassly
economic analysis.108 Despite this criticism, a utilitarian view of copyright has
been popularized among influential thinkers, mostly within the field of law and
economics, where, perhaps predictably, scholars embrace the ideas of incentives
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and trade-offs that serve to maximize wealth creation and minimize transaction
costs.109
By comparison, advocates of the labour theory of intellectual property
maintain that the granting of property rights in relation to one’s intellectual
efforts is merely the formal recognition of a natural right to the fruits of one’s
labour. The labour theory of property is attributed to John Locke, who argued
that individuals have a property right in their bodies.110 When individuals mix
their labour with something in the material world, Locke contends that they also
acquire a property right in that thing.111 Fisher acknowledges that one persistent
critique of the Lockean labour theory is whether it properly applies to intangible
goods at all112 — after all, tangible goods are rivalrous, while intangible goods
are not. When one ‘‘mixes labour” with a tangible good like a plot of land, and
that good is later appropriated, the labourer is deprived of their property. By
comparison, when one labours on producing a novel, and the fruits of that
labour are appropriated, the original labourer is not deprived of their words —
they may be deprived of the ability to economically exploit that novel, but given
the nonrivalrous nature of intangibles, they are not deprived of the creation
itself. This critique is examined in full by feminist copyright scholar Carys Craig,
who warns that a Lockean approach to copyright law misunderstands copyright
as the recognition of a relationship between an author and their works, where
instead copyright exists to serve a social policy goal and is better characterized as
rooted in the relationship between the author and the public.113
To a lesser extent, personality theory and social planning theory have had
some influence on the Anglo-American copyright framework. Under the
personality theory, embraced more fully in continental Europe, authors
express their inviolate personality through their works, and, in recognition of
this relationship, the law extends a property right over that work.114 Social
planning theory, in contrast, justifies copyright with a view to society’s interest in
the work. It attempts to resolve the underlying tension between economic benefit
and social welfare inherent in the utilitarian approach by drawing on many of the
same teleological principles but broadening the scope of social welfare beyond
simply wealth maximization to include other factors that lead to a ‘‘just
society.”115 However, among the social ends sought under this approach is the
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encouragement of creative works, which proponents generally aim to achieve
through the economic incentives afforded by copyright protection, which may
lead one to question whether, in practice, there is a meaningful difference
between the social planning and utilitarian theories.
Even with this simplified overview, it is clear that the creation of personal,
intimate images is an uneasy fit with the common justifications offered for
intellectual property rights. The protection of such images by copyright does not
immediately resonate with concerns about incentivizing intellectual creation or
rewarding socially-beneficial labour, nor with recognizing personhood through
property or advancing some shared vision of human flourishing. While the latter
might have greater resonance when we consider, for example, gender equality
and the value of self-expression, it is the mix of utilitarianism and labour theory
that seem to have the strongest hold on modern copyright law in the AngloAmerican tradition. As a result of this potent brew, in Canada and the U.S.,
copyright law has a decidedly commercial flavour, more closely resembling
economic policy than social policy, focussing narrowly on the remunerative aims
behind the granting of exclusive rights. Copyright scholars, both maximalist and
minimalist, have described this system using terms ripped from the pages of an
economics textbook. For example, Siva Vaidhyanathan refers to copyright as ‘‘a
necessary evil, a limited, artificial monopoly,”116 whereas William Landes and
Richard Posner discuss how understanding the fixed and variable ‘‘cost of
expression” are essential to properly calibrating copyright law.117 Even where
scholars seek to justify copyright from a public interest perspective more closely
aligned with the social planning theory, economic incentives can be found just
below the surface. Craig, making the case for reorienting copyright to address the
over-reliance on Lockean labour theory, argues that the public purpose behind
copyright is to encourage intellectual creativity. She describes a system where
‘‘[r]ights are granted to authors in the belief that intellectual works will be
underproduced unless there is sufficient opportunity to exploit them for financial
return.”118
These theoretical perspectives on copyright are valuable, as they provide the
scaffolding for legislators and judges to build doctrine. However, acknowledging
that property is itself a contested concept, and intellectual property perhaps even
more so, properly characterizing intellectual property rights requires examining
how those theoretical principles are applied in practice — and to what end. This
will, in turn, allow us to assess whether copyright law can, in principle or
practice, respond to the concerns presented by NCDII.
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(a) The Purpose of Copyright Law: a Canadian Analysis
In Canada, copyright is entirely a creature of statute — there is no common
law right to property over one’s creative intellectual creations. 119 Rather, the
Copyright Act creates the only causes of action and remedies relating to
infringement of ‘‘original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic [works].” 120 The
Act also limits the scope of copyright and provides a number of exceptions under
which copyrighted content can be used, without authorization, for specific
purposes.121 Somewhat curiously, the Act contains no statements on the purpose
of copyright doctrine, and so the exercise of providing justification for the
scheme has been left entirely to the courts. In the 2002 case Galerie d’art du Petit
Champlain inc. c. The´berge, the Supreme Court of Canada spoke definitively on
the purpose of copyright law in Canada,122 following years of confusion that saw
lower courts take differing perspectives on the intentions underlying the grant of
property rights over creative works.
Examining the pre-The´berge jurisprudence, it is clear that courts have relied
heavily on theoretical frameworks to guide their interpretations. Since copyright
is entirely a creature of statute, it is relatively simple to conclude that it does not
flow from innate or natural rights to the products of one’s intellectual labour, as
suggested by the Lockean labour theory of property. It is more difficult to square
that statement with case law demonstrating that Locke’s theories have
significantly influenced judicial interpretation of copyright law in Canada.
Craig, considering the Canadian originality threshold, points to a legal tug-ofwar in lower court decisions over the appropriate originality standard. 123 In
order to benefit from copyright protection, a work must be original, and lower
court cases reveal decades of struggle between two schools of thought on the
originality threshold — the ‘‘sweat of the brow” school and the ‘‘creativity”
school.124 Adherents to the sweat of the brow approach held that, for a work to
be original, all that is required is an investment of time and labour. 125 In
opposition, adherents to the creativity school believe something more is required,
a ‘‘creative spark” that would justify the granting of property rights over an
intellectual creation.126 Underlying the sweat of the brow school is the inherently
Lockean proposition that the investment of labour alone is enough to justify
119
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copyright protection, as it prevents others from reaping where they have not
sown. Craig outlines how the Federal Court of Appeal swung precipitously
between the two extremes on the originality threshold, first embracing the
creativity school in the 1997 case of Tele-Direct (Publications) Inc. v. American
Business Information Inc.,127 then reversing position in a ‘‘dramatic turnabout
decision” and endorsing a position firmly within the sweat of the brow school in
the early 2002 case CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada.128
Craig elaborates on the powerful normative pull of Lockean natural rights
theory, noting that
the property right conferred by copyright legislation is understood as a
reward for intellectual labour and effort, and that reward is in turn
regarded as something ‘deserved.’ What is deserved becomes an
entitlement, a heavily loaded concept that carries with it a normative
force ill-suited to copyright law.129

This discussion proves relevant because the choice of an appropriate
originality threshold turns on the purpose of copyright. If copyright’s purpose is
simply to reward individuals for intellectual labour, then the ‘‘sweat of the brow”
standard seems appropriate in that it rewards labourers with an enforceable
monopoly over the fruits of their labour, however little creativity was involved.
If, however, rewarding creators is not the only purpose of copyright, then
perhaps there is an originality threshold that better advances copyright’s other
objectives.
When in The´berge the Supreme Court finally turned its mind to the purpose
of copyright, there, too, were remnants of a Lockean influence. Binnie J, writing
for the majority, stated that the underlying (and unstated) purpose of the
Copyright Act is to strike a ‘‘balance between promoting the public interest in the
encouragement and dissemination of works of the arts and intellect and
obtaining a just reward for the creator.”130 In articulating this dual purpose of
copyright, the decision exhibited a clear utilitarian streak. Describing the nature
of the balance in crassly economic terms, Binnie J says that copyright law creates
a system of incentives to spur the creation of new works and that, operating
optimally, ‘‘it would be as inefficient to overcompensate artists and authors...as it
would to undercompensate them.”131 To overcompensate the author, Binnie J
says, would be to grant them ‘‘excessive control” which ‘‘may unduly limit the
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ability of the public domain to incorporate and embellish creative innovation in
the long-term interests of society as a whole.”132
Although both the author’s economic and moral rights133 are at issue in
The´berge, it is clear that economic rights take precedence in the majority’s
reasons. In fact, in the opening paragraphs of the judgement, the Court explicitly
takes note of the primacy of economic rights, saying that ‘‘copyright law has
traditionally been more concerned with economic than moral rights.” 134
Examining the impact of the The´berge decision, Daniel Gervais characterizes
the supremacy of economic rights as a key takeaway from the case. 135 In
adopting an instrumentalist approach to copyright that focuses on economic
efficiency, the Court endorses a theory of copyright wherein effective incentives
are the means to accomplish its dual purpose. Read together with another key
element of the decision — that copyright is inherently limited in nature, and that
exceptions to copyright are an integral mechanism through which these
limitations are operationalized — we are left with a practical scheme that
engages in balancing the author’s interest against the public interest, using
predominantly economic considerations to guide the weighing process. This
approach is consonant with how the Court resolved the conflict between the
sweat and creativity schools in CCH, ultimately settling on a standard — skill
and judgment — which it described as a mid-point between the two competing
approaches.136 McLachlin CJ, writing for the Court, described the standard as a
‘‘workable yet fair” approach that balances incentives and costs.137
Case law examining the scope of the Copyright Act’s fair dealing provisions
also provides support for this economically driven perspective on copyright.
Under section 29 of the Act, use of copyrighted content without authorization is
permitted for a limited number of purposes.138 In CCH, the Supreme Court
adopted six factors to assess whether dealing is fair.139 The sixth factor — the
effect of the dealing on the work — looks at the impact of the dealing on the
market for the original work. Here, the significant influence of the U.S. fair use
132
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doctrine is noteworthy. In the fair use analysis, the economic impact of the use
on the market for the original is recognized as the preeminent factor in
determining the fairness of use.140 Although the Court is careful to state that,
under Canadian fair dealing, the factor assessing the economic impact of the
dealing on the original work is ‘‘neither the only factor nor the most important
factor,” it has in subsequent cases proven to be an important consideration.141
The jurisprudence demonstrates the predominance of the instrumentalist,
economic approach to copyright law in Canada. Here, the courts have enacted a
careful balancing regime between the economic rights of authors and the broader
goal of encouraging creative intellectual endeavours and fostering a vibrant
public domain. These two aims are achieved in tandem by honouring the
incentive system enacted through the Copyright Act and providing for a range of
circumstances under which the exclusive rights of a copyright owner are limited,
allowing for permissionless copying and avoiding the pitfalls of ‘‘excessive
control.”142
Returning to the issue of intimate images, it is clear that the framework laid
out in the Copyright Act and developed by the courts would afford protection to
such images as works demonstrating the minimal but sufficient amount of skill
and judgement required. Moreover, because most intimate images are selfies, the
rights would accrue to the author/subject. However, as creative works that exist
and circulate outside of the market and without economic purpose, these kinds of
images are arguably peripheral to the copyright system and its public policy goals
— with a view to the ‘‘nature of the work,” the creation of private sexual images
are far from ‘‘the core of copyright’s protective purposes.”143

3. THE PROPERTIZATION OF INTIMATE IMAGES CANNOT
COMPENSATE FOR ABUSE RESULTING IN HARMS TO DIGNITY,
PRIVACY, AND SAFETY
In assessing whether an intellectual property law framework can suitably
respond when intimate images are used to abuse, understanding the original
motivations behind their creation is critical. Creating and exchanging intimate
images is common behaviour, and recent research shows this trend is on the rise
during the COVID-19 pandemic.144 Much of the research available looks at the
practice of sexting — a term for sharing sexually explicit messages, some of
140
141

142
143
144

Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539 (N.Y. Sup., 1985).
York University v. The Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2020
FCA 77, 2020 CarswellNat 1294, 2020 CarswellNat 4546 (F.C.A.), affirmed York
University v. Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency (Access Copyright), 2021 CarswellNat 2815, 2021 CarswellNat 2816 (S.C.C.).
The´berge, supra note 122 at para 31.
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music Ltd., 510 U.S. 569 (1994) at 586.
Justin J Lehmiller et al, “Less Sex, but More Sexual Diversity: Changes in Sexual
Behavior during the COVID-19 Coronavirus Pandemic” (2020) Leisure Sciences at 6.

356 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY

[19 C.J.L.T.]

which are text-only, but which often include nude or semi-nude images.
Depending on the study, somewhere between 20145 and 80 percent146 of people
say they have engaged in sexting in committed or casual relationships.
Individuals create intimate photos and videos for a variety of reasons, and
there is ample evidence that this kind of sexual expression can create positive
outcomes when all parties are interested in the creation and viewing of the
images. Some of the most commonly cited motivations for sending sexually
explicit photos or videos include flirting, initiating sex, and responding to a
request from a partner.147 Although some differences have been observed
between men and women who engage in sharing intimate images, at least one
study shows that the most common reason for sending an intimate image — to
excite the recipient — was the same for men and women. 148 However, a study by
Morgan Johnstonbaugh revealed notable differences on the basis of gender,
namely that women were four times more likely than men to share sexual images
as a way to feel empowered, and twice as likely as men to say that they sent the
image to boost their confidence.149 In the context of committed relationships,
sending intimate images can have an intimacy-building effect, and research
reveals that people who sent sexual images to committed partners were
significantly more likely to report positive consequences, as compared to those
who made the exchange in casual or cheating relationships.150 Among young
people, pleasure and amusement are frequently cited as reasons to create and
share intimate images.151 Additionally, many youth report that sexting is a way
they can safely experiment with their sexuality, especially for those teens who are
not sexually active or involved in a sexual relationship.152
On the other hand, sharing intimate images can be the result of coercion by a
partner. Sexting coercion is reported in significant numbers by both men and
women and is highly correlated with other forms of intimate partner aggression,
as well as negative mental health symptoms. 153 Here, there are also significant
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gendered differences. Research suggests that men are more likely than women to
send messages propositioning sexual activity,154 and that men are twice as likely
as women to have sexted with a casual partner than a committed partner. 155 This
is significant as it has been persistently observed that women are far more likely
than men to face long-term, negative consequences to their relationships and
reputations for being viewed as promiscuous.156
Even where their exchange is consensual, intimate images can be weaponized
to abuse. The relative ease with which digital content can be copied and
distributed makes it difficult to know if and when images have been copied and
shared. All too commonly, NCDII survivors report that they shared their images
consensually with intimate partners who later distributed those images without
their permission. 157 Even services like Snapchat — popularized for its
‘‘disappearing messages” feature, which made it an attractive platform to share
intimate images — were not safe from the copy/paste phenomenon, as there were
multiple ways for individuals to circumvent the ephemeral design of the
messaging features. For example, users could take screenshots of the image or
use a second phone to make a copy.158 Entire websites with names like
‘‘Snapchat Leaked” and ‘‘Snapchat Nudes” were created to host nonconsensually distributed images that were originally taken by Snapchat users
who thought that they were sharing for a limited period of time in a closed
ecosystem.159
In the context of the creation and sharing of sexual images for private
purposes, deploying a property law framework to remedy non-consensual
distribution makes little sense. The incentive to create that is the central
justification for copyright law is unnecessary and ill-fitting — for the most part,
individuals who are taking intimate selfies and sending them to a partner,
whether casual or committed, are not driven by a profit motive, and, in all
likelihood, they intend for the photos or videos at issue to remain private as
between the immediate recipient and the author/subject. Here, the
conceptualization of privacy as intimacy is implicated, as those individuals
creating and sharing images with the intent that they retain their contextual
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integrity have a reasonable expectation that those images will not be shared with
the wider public.
However, it is also important to recognize that sexual content is also created
for other purposes, including economic purposes. The rise of OnlyFans — a paid
subscription service where creators make and share (often explicit) content
directly with their fans — has been welcomed by some who see it as a platform
that empowers sex workers and others without some of the exploitative
tendencies that are well-documented in the commercial pornography
industry.160 Although this type of intimate commercial content is generally not
the source of NCDII, distribution without consent may still be a relevant
consideration for people who are in the sex work community, but whose realworld identities are not associated with their work, or who find their paywalled
content distributed for free on commercial sites like Pornhub. Independent erotic
filmmaker Erika Lust has advocated extensively for the rights of performers in
the pornography industry to be paid for the content they create, calling out ‘‘tube
sites” with lax policies on unverified uploads and stolen porn.161 In these cases,
exercising a proprietary right over intimate content is logical, especially as the
context of its creation falls within the boundaries of copyright’s purview: the
generation of economic benefit through the exercise of exclusive rights over
original artistic creations.
Both commercial and non-commercial intimate images are the result of
artistic labour. Equally, there is a societal good worthy of protection in
encouraging the creation of sexual images intentionally commercialized by their
creators, as well as private sexual images shared in trusting relationships. Where
the two diverge is in the interests underlying their creation and protection,
thereby necessitating a different approach to remedy misuse.

(a) Using Copyright Law to combat NCDII
In some cases, copyright law can provide victims of NCDII with powerful
remedies. It has been particularly useful for women in the U.S., where the most
desired remedy — removing intimate images from online sources — is within the
scope of copyright law. Specifically, under section 512 of Title 17 of the United
States Code, online service providers are provided with a limited safe harbour
from liability under copyright law.162 In order to qualify for this safe harbour,
service providers must comply with a ‘‘notice and takedown” procedure under
which copyright owners can send notices to service providers to have copyrighted
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content removed.163 Section 512 was enacted in 1998 by the DMCA, and it is
now the predominant tool relied upon by copyright owners in policing
infringement of copyrighted content online — as of 2016, Google alone was
fielding 75 million DMCA notices every month.164 Under it, ‘‘service providers”
include everything from websites run by individuals, to internet service providers
(ISPs), to online platforms like Twitter and Facebook. 165 The DMCA provides
what is truly an extraordinary remedy and one that is only available for
copyrighted content. Section 230 of the U.S. Communications Decency Act
provides online platforms with a broad immunity when they are hosting usergenerated content.166 There is no process analogous to the procedure in place for
copyright for the expeditious removal of defamation, harassment, or content that
violates other rights. As a result of broad interpretation by U.S. courts, critics
argue that Section 230 acts as a bar to litigation against platforms, which, when
paired with online anonymity, means that complainants are left without legal
recourse.167 Copyright, on the other hand, is explicitly exempted from the
Section 230 framework. Copyright lobby groups, largely funded by the music
and movie industries, are some of the most well-resourced powerbrokers in the
U.S.,168 and through their efforts they have secured a mechanism to remedy
violations of their intellectual property rights unlike any other provided under
U.S. law.
Even though the DMCA is U.S. law, its impacts are felt far beyond U.S.
borders. This is largely a practical effect as opposed to an intended legal effect,
owing to the fact that many of the largest online platforms in the digital
ecosystem are U.S. companies and are therefore subject to U.S. law. 169 There are
certainly examples of Canadian copyright owners sending DMCA notices.170 If,
for example, a Canadian complainant found an intimate image to which she
owned the copyright posted on Facebook, that person could send a notice to
163
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Facebook under the U.S. notice and takedown procedures and have the photo
removed. Even sites operating in Canada that are not explicitly subject to the
DMCA have been known to create policies to address the likelihood that they
might be sent DMCA notices. Canadian ecommerce site Shopify171 and
Canadian dating service Ashley Madison 172 both have procedures for
processing DMCA notices and removing content that has been flagged as
infringing copyright, even though Canadian copyright law does not provide a
notice and takedown framework.
Canadian copyright law does provide remedies that may be attractive to
individuals seeking to have content removed from online platforms, although
there is no analogous procedure to the one created by the U.S. DMCA. Under
the Copyright Act, Canadian intermediaries are obligated to comply with a
number of requirements to facilitate copyright owners’ attempts to enforce their
rights. First, in order to qualify for limited immunity for infringement,
intermediaries in Canada must comply with a ‘‘notice and notice” process,
under which they must forward notices of alleged infringement and retain
customer data that would allow copyright owners to pursue the primary
infringer.173 Beyond passing along the notice, intermediaries have limited
obligations to remove or disable access to content. For search engines, this
requirement is limited to situations in which the infringing content has already
been removed from its original location174 or where an injunction has been issued
by a court.175 Content hosts must remove content only after they become aware
of a court order declaring it to be infringing.176 Additionally, individuals can
bring an action for copyright infringement in a court of competent jurisdiction,
seeking damages and an injunction to remove the infringing work.177
In the U.S., copyright may indeed be a practical mechanism through which
individuals can seek the removal of intimate photos or videos posted online
without their consent. In Canada, there are a number of ways in which it is
impractical. First, Canadians’ use of the DMCA to remove copyrighted content
is an option only to the extent that the websites hosting the content are governed
by U.S. law or otherwise adopt policies and practices that reflect U.S. law. Even
where content is posted on American sites or online services that are subject to
the DMCA, there are reasons why sending notices may be ineffective. For
example, sites designed for the explicit purpose of posting abusive images are
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unlikely to be persuaded to remove the content by way of a notice, as operators
know that the abusive images belong to individuals who cannot afford the cost
— whether financial, emotional, reputational, or personal — of a lawsuit. 178
Second, for Canadians attempting to use Canadian law, the notice-and-notice
regime may also prove to be a disappointment. As mentioned, there is no
obligation for intermediaries to remove or disable access to content upon the
receipt of a notice — instead, the obligation is to pass along the notice to the
content provider. In the case of NCDII, it is likely that the person posted the
photo or video knowing there was no consent. Additionally, research into the
issue of NCDII shows that these kinds of images are often posted on websites
that have the express purpose of distributing non-consensual intimate images, 179
once again making it unlikely that the content provider would be induced to
remove the image based on a notice. Third, pursuing a copyright claim in court is
expensive and time consuming. In most cases, the expenses associated with hiring
a lawyer and bringing a claim would far exceed the damages that would be
awarded for a successful copyright suit.180 Many complainants are also
dissuaded by the knowledge that filing a claim in court may lead to additional
attention and publicity surrounding their situation.

(b) Copyright Law does not Adequately Respond to the Nature of the Injury
In addition to the practical reasons why copyright may not be the ideal tool
for addressing NCDII, there are also compelling normative arguments against
putting those harmed by this kind of image-based sexual abuse in a position
where they feel the need to resort to property law remedies. The harm resulting
from NCDII, properly framed, is rooted in privacy, dignity, and equality
interests, and circulation of intimate images often results in a threat to the
physical safety of those targeted. By comparison, copyright doctrine as it has
developed in the Anglo-American tradition focuses primarily on providing
authors with the opportunity to economically exploit their creations for profit. 181
This fundamental misalignment between the values at stake means that copyright
law is incapable of properly responding to NCDII harms. It also leaves
individuals who are not the authors of their own intimate images without
remedy, altering women’s sexual expression by compelling them to take their
own images if they want to avoid the perverse result of being the subject of an
intimate image that they have little legal control over.
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As demonstrated above, copyright can be an effective tool in some
circumstances, especially when it comes to the expeditious removal of content
online. However, it is also designed to foreground economic considerations.
Obliging individuals who are the targets of image-based sexual abuse to seek a
remedy in which the harm claimed is to their economic interests further degrades
targets and trivializes the injury. The purpose of the copyright balance — to
secure a just reward for creators while ensuring that the public interest is also
served — leaves little room for privacy, dignity, and personal safety to be
considered within the framework of copyright. A key facet of the harm is a
violation of sexual autonomy and fundamental human rights, not only on the
part of the individual survivor, but also with respect to the broader interests of
women and girls in society. Despite the public interest balancing inherent in the
copyright framework, the exhaustive statutory scheme does not recognize human
rights as implicated by copyright, even though granting a monopoly over
expression necessarily invokes freedom of expression concerns and likely engages
other fundamental rights.182 In fact, when courts consider the public interest in
copyright balancing, most often this factor tends toward more permissive
sharing, as ‘‘public interest” is typically synonymous with the dissemination and
accessibility of works in copyright jurisprudence. The misalignment between
copyright and private sexual images is even more obvious in light of Binnie J’s
comments about the need for copyright law to avoid granting ‘‘excessive control”
to the author. In the context of intimate images, there is arguably less room for
concern about excessive control; a person should be able to exercise nearcomplete control183 over sexual images of themselves, and any compelling fair
use argument that advanced through the copyright frame should yield to the
privacy and contextual integrity concerns central to the purpose of the work’s
creation.
Further, cabining NCDII within the copyright paradigm imputes certain
values to this kind of sexual expression that are entirely inappropriate in the
context of intimate images weaponized against their authors. As we have seen, it
is well recognized that the economic monopoly granted to copyright owners is
meant to compensate them for their intellectual creation and indeed to
incentivize the creation and dissemination of works. In the context of intimate
images, the assumption attending copyright protection is that the creator is the
beneficiary of an economic incentive to create and disseminate works. Unlike
consensual pornography that is publicly shared by the subjects with a view to a
profit, sexual expression for non-commercial purposes as an act of intimacy
building within a relationship is not intended to be traded in the creative
marketplace. Here, the dominant economic rights framework is ill-suited to
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address the harms that occur when these images or videos are decontextualized
and distributed without the consent of the individual author/subject.
Copyright’s subordinate doctrine, moral rights, is also an unsatisfactory tool
for NCDII survivors to seek redress. Generally speaking, moral rights consist of
an integrity right that protects against distortion and mutilation of the work 184
and a right of attribution and association, which safeguards an author’s choice to
have their works attributed (or not) and protects against unauthorized uses of the
work that associate it with a product, service, cause, or institution. 185 In both
instances, prejudice to the author’s honour or reputation must be
demonstrated.186 In Wiseau Studio et al. v. Richard Harper, Schabas J
described the moral rights infringement framework, saying that the court will
consider both the subjective views of the plaintiff and objective evidence, but
warned that ‘‘moral rights are not, and cannot be, determined solely on the
feelings or opinions of the creator of a work.”187 With respect to the integrity
branch of moral rights, it is unlikely this avenue would be of practical use to
complainants whose images have not been distorted in some way.188 Perhaps this
branch of moral rights could be more easily plead in the context of sexualized
deepfakes — where images are deliberately altered and manufactured with the
aid of artificial intelligence.189 However, NCDII images are frequently unaltered,
especially considering that the purpose behind the distribution is often to identify
the subject, and the harm that flows from their unauthorized distribution tends
not to be a result of modifications made to the original.
Attribution appears more promising on its face, but bringing a complaint in
this manner may force women to incur further harm. In a case where an NCDII
image was shared without the author/subject’s name attached, arguing that it is
infringing on the basis that it is not associated with the author is self-defeating as
claimants are bringing their action precisely because they do not want their image
publicly associated with them. Attribution also protects an author’s right to
remain anonymous, and as such it could potentially be used to prevent
association by name with the image. However, this provides only a half solution,
as disassociating the author from their image does nothing to prevent its further
circulation.
If, alternatively, a woman argues the image has resulted in harm to her
reputation or honour, this may require framing her complaint in a way that relies
on the sex-negative assumption that consensual sexual expression reflects poorly
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on her character.190 This is particularly so since the plaintiff must establish that
the impact on honour or reputation is objectively prejudicial.191 Further, the
purpose of making a moral rights argument as opposed to an economic rights
argument, in this context, is to find a method of framing complaints that does
not rely on injury to a woman’s economic interests. Unfortunately, the close
nexus between moral and economic rights makes threading this needle very
challenging. As David Vaver describes it, the development of moral rights was in
recognition of the entrepreneurial efforts that creative people exerted in order to
build a reputation in the community that allowed them to sell their works. 192 He
characterizes moral rights as a trademark-like consumer protection mechanism,
promoting truth-in-advertising and facilitating functioning creative markets. In
this light, even a claim for moral rights infringement undertaken with the explicit
aim of avoiding the misalignment between intellectual property rights and
NCDII harms ultimately leaves women in the same uncomfortable position,
arguing that the real harm is to their economic interests or reputation as an artist/
author and not their dignity, safety, and privacy.
Finally, it is difficult to see how a claim under either the integrity branch or
the attribution/association branch of moral rights would be well suited to
address the issue of NCDII, given how rarely this doctrine is invoked in Canada.
In light of the dearth of case law and, in particular, the paucity of successful
claims by authors claiming a violation of moral rights, it would be additionally
burdensome to require that complainants who wished to bring a claim against
their abuser devise a novel argument that would meet the standards set out in the
Act. Additionally, moral rights claims are often most effective when the author is
not the owner of the economic rights. Where the author has claim to both moral
and economic rights, the invocation of moral rights can be seen as duplicative or
even moot, and moral rights claims are practically more difficult to advance
because prejudice must be shown.193 At its most basic, recourse for the nonconsensual sharing of intimate images should be clearly defined and should
provide an expeditious avenue for victims to have content disabled and removed.
Although on paper moral rights may seem a more appropriate avenue for
redress, they continue to present problems, both practical and principled, when it
comes to tackling NCDII.
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(c) Can a Feminist Reconstruction of Copyright Transform it into an
Appropriate Remedy?
Feminist copyright scholars have long argued that copyright and the broader
intellectual property system is designed to help certain groups over others and
fails to respond to the needs of women. Ann Bartow grounds her critique in the
origins of copyright laws, arguing that they ‘‘began as implements of censorship”
and that they remain tools of control.194 She further questions the truism at the
heart of copyright law, namely that the complex system of restrictions and
incentives is actually necessary for the flourishing of creative endeavours. 195
Here, she argues that ‘‘copyright laws were written by men to embody a male
vision of the ways in which creativity and commerce should intersect.” 196
Feminist scholars have equally rejected the romantic conception of authorship
that views the author as an original genius, creating something from nothing. 197
Craig argues that this sole genius is inherently a male construction firmly rooted
in the Lockean conception of property as arising out of self-ownership. 198 A
feminist reconstruction, she posits, would embrace the relational and dialogic
nature of creativity and expression, rearranging our understanding of an author’s
relationship to her work and to others.199 Finally, many have criticized copyright
law for excluding from its protection creative endeavours that have historically
been the work of women, including food and clothing.200
In the context of NCDII, the question is whether a feminist reconstruction of
copyright law can redeem its use as a remedy for non-consensual distribution. In
general, the feminist approach to copyright advocates for reducing private
copyright owners’ power to control in a way ‘‘that facilitates a significant
amount of unauthorized excerpting, adapting, and sampling by declining to
deem it infringing.”201 Putting aside the practical challenges inherent in
attempting to radically reshape the copyright landscape — after all,
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beneficiaries of maximalist copyright provisions are some of the most powerful
and influential corporations on earth, with seemingly unlimited resources to
lobby lawmakers for increasingly severe copyright laws — it is doubtful that this
approach is consonant with providing the remedies sought by NCDII victims. If
a feminist approach to copyright encourages more flexibility and sharing, free
from the strictures of authorization by an existing copyright holder,202 then this
open-by-design position is logically incompatible with redressing harm that
arises predominantly out of making public what was meant to be private as
between certain people or a limited group. Where the aim is to fit the responsible,
non-commercial exchange of intimate images within a property law framework,
an approach that recognizes and prioritizes the privacy and sexual autonomy of
the author/subject is more in line with the near-absolute control conferred to
authors as the system currently stands. While limiting the monopoly individual
authors enjoy over their works may indeed lead to a net benefit for women and
society at large, this reconstruction is incoherent with the right to exercise
increased and exclusive control through the expansion of intellectual property.
Despite this, the feminist position on copyright does not necessarily support
the imposition of a sweeping imperative of more-or-less protection. Rather,
feminist perspectives on copyright make room for consideration of social
context, power dynamics, and substantive equality, and recognize copyright for
what it is: a political tool that empowers certain people while disempowering
others. Indeed, it can be argued that a feminist reconstruction of copyright would
support its use to advance gender equality in a pragmatic context, as in the case
of NCDII, while recognizing its limits and continuing to train an eye on the
potential unintended consequences of extending copyright protections and
further empowering private owners without due regard to equality, dignity, and
privacy. However, this view can be equally complicated by the observations of
Black feminist writer Audre Lourde, who warns that it is the ‘‘primary tool of all
oppressors to keep the oppressed occupied with the master’s concerns”. 203 Here,
copyright may fairly be seen as the master’s tool, incapable of dismantling the
master’s house.
The tension between control and access in the context of intimate images is
seemingly better resolved by approaching copyright from a personality-based
perspective that the Anglo-American tradition has been loath to embrace. Under
this framework, private property rights are extended to intangible creative works
only to the extent that they promote human flourishing. Jeremey Waldron argues
that a personhood approach to copyright can advance a variety of interests,
including three that seem specifically relevant in the context of NCDII: privacy,
individual self-realization, and identity.204 Extending intellectual property rights
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on the basis of these interests seems to align with the overarching contextual
considerations unique to intimate images. The problem with this approach,
however, is that it exchanges our well-established system with defined purposes
and clear mechanisms for one that is nebulous, perhaps raising more questions
than it answers. Fisher advances this critique, arguing that the conceptions of
personhood we are trying to protect by way of a property right are ‘‘too abstract
and thin to provide answers to many specific questions.” 205 Without more clarity
on what it means to protect ‘‘personhood” through intellectual property, it is
likely that such an approach could set up a system where control of all artistic
expression is further divorced from the dual purpose of copyright law — a
careful balancing of the economic interests of authors with the broader public
interest in seeking and receiving information, and safeguarding a robust public
domain enabling creative expression to flourish. Additionally, a shift to increased
reliance on personhood theory, which is itself inherently rooted in patriarchal
notions of the individual author as originator,206 supports greater protections for
author/owners, proving harmful to feminist causes in other contexts, including
where the subject of a photograph is not its author/owner.207
Consistent with a personhood approach, revising or supplementing Canada’s
moral rights doctrine could align the exercise of copyright with a set of values
that are, at a theoretical level, more appropriate for addressing NCDII harms.
Consider the approach taken in France, Germany, and Italy, where, by
comparison to the Canadian statutory scheme, inalienable moral rights are
much broader, including the right to control disclosure and withdrawal. 208
However, in practice the continental European copyright framework bears
striking similarities to the Lockean labour theory and has the effect of further
entrenching an author’s absolute control over creative works in a way that is
incompatible with a feminist reformulation of copyright. Relying on the right to
control disclosure and withdrawal means reorienting copyright towards broad
control to achieve narrow objectives sought by NCDII survivors. The level of
control necessitated by such a reorienting bears little relation to the articulated
purposes of copyright, which is at least as concerned with encouraging the
dissemination of works as it is with allowing authors to control them. While
NCDII survivors deserve a practical and effective remedy for the harms they
have suffered, overhauling copyright law or reorienting its policy objectives to
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respond to this specific concern is likely to have unintended consequences for
copyright doctrine more generally. It should now be clear that a better solution
would be to develop a remedy outside of copyright that responds to the unique
issues raised in the NCDII context.

CONCLUSION
The harms resulting from NCDII are serious, and in a society shaped by
patriarchal ideas about sex and sexuality, they are almost inevitably more severe
for women and girls whose sexual privacy is violated when their images are
circulated online without their consent. Regardless of who is targeted by this
abusive behaviour, it is a failure of law to leave NCDII victims/survivors without
effective remedies that provide expeditious takedowns. Copyright law, although
unsatisfying from a theoretical (and sometimes practical) perspective, remains
one of the only legal tools that can be used by those targeted to remove their
images from the Internet. Moreover, logical alternatives such as a sui generis tort
action have not been implemented despite the mainstreaming of NCDII as a
form of image-based sexual abuse and its increasing frequency. However, by
pressing individuals towards copyright remedies, the law suggests that the real
injury is that their copyright has been infringed, giving them the impression that
their intellectual property is valued more than their sexual privacy and
autonomy. Instead of revising copyright doctrine to remedy the serious harms
caused by NCDII — which could have harmful consequences for copyright
policy, particularly viewed from a critical feminist perspective — we should
instead seek to recognize that the unique contextual circumstances surrounding
intimate images require a tailored solution designed to account for the interests
at stake.
The argument is not that NCDII victims/survivors should not use copyright
law to address the harms flowing from non-consensual disclosure, especially in
light of the relative strength and efficiency of intellectual property remedies as
compared to other civil and even criminal law avenues. Instead, it is incumbent
on lawmakers to legislate a tailor-made legal remedy for NCDII such as the fasttrack tort proposed by Young and Laidlaw that provides women and others
targeted with a process that is at least as expeditious and powerful as intellectual
property law remedies, but that also acknowledges the serious harms to dignity,
privacy, and equality that go well beyond the harm resulting from copyright
infringement. Further, copyright law fails to address — and, in fact, an
overreliance on copyright remedies may serve to exacerbate problems with
regard to — images in which the subjects are not the authors. Ultimately, it is
likely that a suite of remedies from both the criminal and civil law will be
necessary to address the breadth of harms inflicted by individuals who weaponize
sexual expression against others. Whatever the result, crafting remedies for
NCDII should begin with a deep understanding of this harm and refrain from
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pushing victims/survivors towards a framework that further trivializes their
suffering.

